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Abstract. Nowadays, the public-private partnership (PPP) scheme has been widely adopted in infrastructure projects around the 
world. In PPP projects, the governments participate as a principal and the investors play the role of an agent, and therefore their 
behaviours and incentive strategies can be explained and designed by the principal-agent theory. As “economic men” with limited 
rationality, both the governments and the investors have altruistic preferences during cooperation. This paper studies how project 
participants’ altruistic preferences affect government subsidies based on the principal-agent theory. To this end, a principal-agent 
model in the presence of altruism is developed. The results show that the amount of government compensation is related to the 
altruistic preferences, the expected revenue, costs and investors’ efforts. Contrary to intuition, the governments’ altruism actu-
ally undermines the investors’ enthusiasm in cooperation and the risk-sharing propensity, although it increases the utilities of 
both parties. Moreover, when selecting the investors, governments should examine their operating capacity carefully, which has 
a significant impact on the sustainable development of the projects and even PPP arrangements. The findings contribute new 
insights into the development of incentive mechanisms between governments and private investors from the perspective of the 
behavioural preferences.
Keywords: public-private partnership projects, government guarantee, principal-agent theory, altruistic theory, risk-sharing, 
subsidies.
Introduction
Public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements have gained 
worldwide popularity in the provision of public services 
and products, such as plants, highways and tunnels (Song, 
Zhao, Jin, & Sun, 2018). Generally authorized by the gov-
ernments, private investors recover their investment mainly 
through user payment (for instance, toll revenue) during 
the operation stage of these PPP projects (Feng, Zhang, & 
Gao, 2015). However, the infrastructure projects are fraught 
with risks (e.g., demand risk and force majeure risk etc.), 
which results in great uncertainties with regard to achieving 
the investors’ expected rate of return (Wang, Gao, & Liu, 
2019). Since PPP projects usually present strong public wel-
fare and poor profitability, investors may not acquire rea-
sonable profits only through the operation revenue, which 
even cannot cover the operation cost. In this scenario, gov-
ernments should provide some substantial economic subsi-
dies as specified in the concession agreement agreed upon 
by both parties to ensure PPP projects commercially viable 
(Song et  al., 2018; Soumaré, 2016; Sun & Zhang, 2014; 
Wang, Cui, & Liu, 2018; Xu, Yeung, & Jiang, 2014). By the 
end of June 2019, there are 8414 projects with government 
subsidies in China alone, accounting for 93.1% (Ministry of 
Finance of the People’s Republic of China, 2019).
From the perspective of the traditional economic 
theory, the most fundamental duty of the investors shall 
be accountable to all shareholders, and their original goal 
is to derive the maximum profits, which is no exception 
for private investors of PPP projects (Wang & Liu, 2015). 
Nonetheless, more and more economists have pointed out 
that the profits for the investors consist of not only the 
direct profits of projects, but also some invisible benefits 
from achieving social benefits and enhancing corporate 
value. In the late 1990s, Carroll (1991) proposed a hier-
archical responsibility model for corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR), indicating that investors hold economic 
and legal responsibilities, as well as ethical and charitable 
responsibilities. In PPP projects, based on the completion 
of the basic economic activities, altruism helps investors 
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develop good political relations with governments and at-
tract the attention of the media to promote the corporate 
image (Borghesi, Houston, & Naranjo, 2014). More im-
portantly, appropriate altruistic preferences are conducive 
to improve the project efficiency, thus creating additional 
external values for both governments and investors (Dur 
& Tichem, 2015; Ge, Zhang, Lü, Zhou, & Xi, 2012).
Although the original motive of economic philan-
thropy is self-interests rather than altruism, the practi-
cal results show that this kind of non-subjective altruism 
has achieved a win-win situation between enterprises and 
recipients (Ge & Hu, 2012). Compared with the profit-
able projects using other schemes, the investment return 
of PPP projects is typically lower. But these projects usu-
ally bring benefits to the society in terms of environment, 
employment, medical care and transportation etc., further 
improving the social value of private investors and ulti-
mately contributing to maximizing profits (Moore, Board-
man, & Vining, 2017; Wu et al., 2018). Therefore, the ap-
propriate government subsidies for investors based on al-
truistic theory helps to encourage them to bear the social 
responsibility forwardly and obtain indirect benefits.
According to the contractual relationship in PPP pro-
jects, the governments participate as a principal and inves-
tors play the role of an agent. Thus, their behaviours and 
incentive strategies can be explained by the principal-agent 
theory. Using this theory, the primary objective of the pa-
per is to construct a government subsidy model (i.e. the 
distribution of government guarantee option value) based 
on altruistic theory to provide a reference for both govern-
ments and private investors. This paper is organized as fol-
lows. First, an overview of the government subsidies in PPP 
projects and altruistic theory is presented. Then, an optimal 
government subsidy model for the governments and the 
investors with altruistic preferences is developed, followed 
by an equilibrium solution. Next, results and implications 
from this model are discussed. Specifically, a numerical 
simulation is presented and the results of this simulation 
are examined to illustrate the theoretical application of this 
model. Finally, the research closes with certain conclusions 
drawn. Exactly, the contribution of the article is to integrate 
altruistic theory with principal-agent theory to address the 
issue of government subsidies for private investors in PPP 
projects. This incentive mechanism is conductive to curb 
opportunistic behaviour of private investors, promoting the 
governance efficiency and sustainable development of PPP 
schemes. The findings stimulate questions about how differ-
ent degrees of altruistic preferences might impact optimal 
government subsidies for both governments and private 
investors in PPP projects.
1. Literature review
1.1. Government subsidies in PPP projects
Fraught with many risks (e.g., construction risk and de-
mand risk, etc.) that may or may not materialize in the 
future, the actual revenue obtained by private investors 
may be less than the estimated one (Wang et  al., 2019). 
Consequently, private investors cannot reap reasonable 
profits and even become entangled in losses. When the 
actual revenue of investors is lower than a pre-specified 
threshold as agreed in the contracts, governments should 
compensate the investors for the difference between the 
estimated and the actual revenue, i.e. the government 
guarantee. In terms of such government guarantee, inves-
tors can receive a certain level of subsidies. Specifically, 
government subsidies present many forms in practice 
worldwide, such as direct investment grants etc. (Shi, Yin, 
& Guo, 2016). In addition, governments can arrange free 
allocation of land use right and grant franchise of the 
surrounding land and commerce, as well as concessional 
loans, loan interest subsidies and the give-up of dividends 
of the government-occupied shares (Feng et  al., 2015; 
Marzouk & Ali, 2018). By nature, government subsidies 
aim to effectively reduce the construction and operation 
costs to mitigate the risks and further improve the eco-
nomic profits to ensure the commercial feasibility of PPP 
projects (Almassi, McCabe, & Thompson, 2012).
Subsidies provided by governments in PPP projects 
amounts to a risk sharing mechanism for project returns 
to some degree (Wibowo et al., 2012). Instead, the gov-
ernments share the revenue risk by providing guarantees, 
including concession guarantees (Carbonara, Costantino, 
& Pellegrino, 2014a; Galera & Soliño, 2010), services or 
products purchasing guarantees (Zhang, Chan, Feng, 
Duan, & Ke, 2016), restrictive competition guarantees 
(Liu, Yu, & Cheah, 2014), price adjustment guarantees 
(Carvalho & Nechio, 2011), minimum demand guaran-
tees (Feng et al., 2015; Song et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019), 
price compensation guarantees (Liu, Gao, & Cheah, 2017; 
Xiong, Zhang, & Chen, 2015), and minimum revenue 
guarantees (MRG) (Buyukyoran & Gundes, 2018; Car-
bonara & Pellegrino, 2018; Carbonara, Costantino, & Pel-
legrino, 2014b). However, too much risk-taking will even-
tually lead to government debt beyond payment capacity, 
thereby causing frequent local government defaults and 
even thorough failures of PPP projects. In those failure 
cases of PPP projects in the worldwide, the governments 
have provided guarantees for investors’ minimum profits 
(Song et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018, 2019). Contrary to 
intuition, excessive government guarantees will lead to 
unreasonable risk sharing, increasing project risks instead 
(Xu et al., 2014). Thus, a reasonable risk allocation mecha-
nism is important to enhance the willingness to cooperate 
and guide private investors in decision-making behaviour, 
and has also a positive impact on the improvement of the 
project performance.
The core principle of risk allocation is to ensure that 
the risk-bearing parties can control these risks best (Na-
sirzadeh, Khanzadi, & Rezaie, 2014). The approaches 
of risk distribution can be categorized into qualitative 
and quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis focuses on 
matching the risk attributes with the risk-taking capaci-
ties of all parties to determine a proper allocation mech-
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anism (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 2010a). However, quantita-
tive analysis is aimed to solve for an optimal proportion 
of risk allocation among different parties to maximise 
the efficiency from the perspective of the whole projects 
(Alonso-Conde, Brown, & Rojo-Suarez, 2007; Fahad Al-
Azemi, Bhamra, & Salman, 2014; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Na-
sirzadeh et al., 2014; Pellegrino, Ranieri, Costantino, & 
Mummolo, 2011).
As shown in Figure 1, with the increased risk shar-
ing by private investors, the project efficiency improves 
and the total project costs decline gradually, signifying 
the value for money (VfM) is increasing (from “a” to “b”). 
Nevertheless, when the transferred risks exceed a certain 
level (point “b”), projects efficiency begins to decline (Ke, 
Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010b). The shaded area is the ra-
tional risk allocation area, and proportions of risk allo-
cated to investors are from point “a” to point “c”. In order 
to achieve the maximum profits, “b” value needs to be 
determined.
Generally, existing researches on the distribution and 
incentive of cooperative profits assume decision-makers 
as economic man, while ignoring the different person-
alities of these decision-makers and the complexity of 
their behaviours. This assumption restricts its explana-
tory power to practical problems (Loch & Wu, 2008). 
With the development of behavioural theory, more 
scholars have realized that individuals actually exist 
as “social beings”, indicating that the decision-makers 
typically have feelings of altruism (Dur & Tichem, 2015; 
Gino & Pisano, 2008). When making decisions regarding 
cooperative behaviours, both governments and private 
investors are not entirely self-interested, but also influ-
enced by their own altruistic preferences, which should 
be paid more attention when allocating the risks in PPP 
projects. Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyse 
the optimal risk distribution mechanism, i.e. the optimal 
government subsidies provided to private investors using 
principal-agent theory and altruistic theory approach. 
The introduction of such behavioural preferences into 
cooperation between the two parties will help to remedy 
the limitations of the existing theoretical researches in 
PPP arrangements (Wang & Liu, 2015).
1.2. Altruistic theory
Behavioural economics and social psychology demon-
strate that when making decisions, human beings not only 
pay attention to their own profits, but also to the profit 
level of others and the fairness of the profit distribution. 
That means people generally have fairness and altruistic 
preferences rather than only self-interested preferences. 
Importantly, these psychological preferences can signifi-
cantly affect the decision-making behaviours (Gino & 
Pisano, 2008; Loch & Wu, 2008). The social preferences 
systematically trigger emotions and that altruistic prefer-
ence is an important determinant affecting decision-mak-
ing utility and individual behaviour (Urda & Loch, 2013). 
The probabilities of cooperation positively correlate with 
players’ altruism (Kułakowski & Gawroński, 2009).
Human altruism is such a powerful and unique pow-
er that a few altruists can force most selfish individuals 
to cooperate (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Evolutionary 
theory postulates that altruistic behaviour evolved for the 
return-benefits it bears the performer (De Waal, 2008). 
That is, behaviourally, altruism is any act that can have 
resulted from altruistic motivations (Elster, 2006). How-
ever, Nandavar, Lewis, and White (2019) believes that no 
act is performed without a motivation. Therefore, altru-
ism can be understood in a psychological sense, which 
motivationally can be treated as the desire to enhance the 
welfare of others at a net welfare loss to oneself (Elster, 
2006). Taking the classical prisoners’ dilemma game as 
an example, the players have clearly expressed an interest 
in behaving altruistically, from which the players always 
expect to personally benefit in some way. Through experi-
ments conducted by Andreoni and Miller (2002), the price 
and income variation creates budgets for altruistic activity 
to test for an underlying preference ordering. And An-
dreoni and Miller (2002) further confirmed the rationality 
of altruism, which can be understand sufficiently by an 
economic model.
Nowadays, most researches concerning altruistic pref-
erences have focused on the many fields, such as supply 
chain (Ge & Hu, 2012), behavioural decision-making 
(Nandavar et  al., 2019) and the carbon market (Salas & 
Roe, 2012) etc. For instance, Ge and Hu (2012) interpreted 
firms’ cooperative incentive as their altruism, and point-
ed out that a manufacturer with altruistic liability would 
benefit both the supply chain and the retailers. Also, the 
performances and the efficiency of supply chain with al-
truistic attributes are significantly improved (Ge et  al., 
2012; Hosoda & Disney, 2006), and both the optimal 
wholesale and retail price are affected (Shi, Jiang, & Ouy-
ang, 2013). Recently, a competitive – cooperative strategy 
with altruism proposed indicates that only offline retailers 
have entirely altruistic behaviour (Xu & Wang, 2018). In 
the respect of guiding behaviour in transportation, such 
altruistic behaviours may help to create a more positive 
and harmonious driving context to improve road safety 
ultimately (Nandavar et al., 2019). Differently, more stud-
ies have focused on altruism of parties with the principal-
 
Figure 1. Risk allocation effects on the monetary value
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agent relationship. Salas and Roe (2012) designed rela-
tional contracts between a selfish agent and an altruistic 
principal, revealing that the principal’s altruism increases 
with the higher credibility of the bonus. Compared with 
the more self-interested principals, the presence of an al-
truistic principal increases the likelihood of cooperation 
in the long-term relationship (Salas & Roe, 2012). Given 
the assumption of some altruistic and unobserved frac-
tion of agents, long-term relational contracts will further 
generate high effort levels, exhibit rent sharing, and pun-
ish low effort with dismissal (Brown, Falk, & Fehr, 2004, 
2012). Dur and Tichem (2015) also developed a simple 
dynamic principal-agent contract containing two types 
of incentives for the agents: a bonus and a threat of dis-
missal. Instead, altruistic behaviours are usually executed 
in the absence of reward anticipation (Piliavin, 2009). To 
conclude the above literature review, altruistic preferences 
definitely have a positive impact on the outcomes and ef-
fectiveness as well as the distribution of profits. Essentially, 
altruism is reciprocal for all participants.
The mutual cooperation, between governments and 
private investors in PPP projects, exactly requires altru-
ism of both parties. Nevertheless, few studies have paid 
attention to the analysis of altruistic theory in such PPP 
projects. Through PPP contracts, private investors are 
authorized to finance, build, operate and maintain the 
projects, and bear the duty for providing public services 
or products; whereas governments subsidize those pro-
jects by sharing the risks with investors to reap reason-
able profits (Almassi et al., 2012; Song et al., 2018; Wang 
et al., 2019). Such trading behaviour between governments 
and private investors can also be explained by altruism 
theory. The governments’ altruism can impact the terms 
of trade in PPP market, while more self-interested inves-
tors to profit maximizing with a tendency to rent seeking 
and corruption will be less likely to achieve cooperation. 
As a result, the altruism enhancement of the two parties is 
an effective way to improve the cooperation efficiency in 
PPP projects. Different from the existing studies to analyse 
the overarching concept of altruism through descriptive or 
explanatory research, this paper believes that altruism is a 
stable personality trait and can be comprehended by some 
attempts. Additionally, both governments and private in-
vestors have feelings of altruism. That is, governments 
and private investors are unconditionally altruistic, and 
the degree of their altruistic preferences can be observ-
able in PPP projects. Therefore, this paper will construct 
a principal-agent model to formulate the optimal govern-
ment subsidy mechanism based on the altruistic prefer-
ences of both parties.
2. Government subsidies model based on 
altruistic theory
For the PPP projects with the return mechanisms of gov-
ernment subsidies, as illustrated in Figure 2, there is a 
difference (∆π) between the investors’ estimated revenue 
(πe) and the real one (πr ). Specifically, πe is defined as the 
average revenue that the investors could receive when they 
participate in other projects. If the governments pay for 
the entire shortfall (∆π), then they effectively take over all 
the investors’ revenue risk. Obviously, this burden should 
be shared between both two parties. Typically, the gov-
ernment guarantees are valuable and can be estimated by 
some techniques such as real option (Cheah & Liu, 2006). 
The distribution of the guarantee value is the flipped side 
of risk allocation. For the governments, the higher the 
share of this value they own, the lesser is the risk that 
they are burdened with. By the same token, the investors 
are also faced with a similar concern.
In the principal-agent model, an agent’s efforts and 
performance are often difficult to verify, and thus the 
moral hazard may occur. For instance, if the governments 
allocate too many risks to private investors during the ne-
gotiation stage, investors’ enthusiasm for the project might 
be negatively impacted. Then, investors might reduce their 
level of productive efforts, such as intentionally keeping 
their real revenue below the estimated threshold to secure 
more guarantee value. Alternatively, they might cut down 
on their facility maintenance efforts, such as reducing the 
required refurbishment and upgrading of equipment and 
technology. As a result, the lower efforts usually lead to 
a lower performance of the facility during the operation 
stage or even when handed over at the end of the conces-
sion. Therefore, a proper risk sharing mechanism needs to 
be designed to reduce the government financial pressure 
and motivate the investors to expend a high level of efforts 
in the project. The difference between the estimated and 
real revenue (πe – πr) is exactly the value shared by two 
parties. The subsidy ratio provided by the governments is 
p, and accordingly the profit-sharing rate of governments 
is (1  – p). The obtained value by the investors consists 
of two parts: earned from their efforts and the subsidy 
provided by the governments. Without considering the 
players’ altruistic preferences, the governments’ and the 
investors’ revenue are expressed respectively as follows:









R a p C
= − × π − π
= + × π − π −
 (1)
where: a is the efforts expended by the investors, and C is 
operation cost paid during the operation stage. Generally 







Figure 2. Difference between investors’ estimate and  
real revenue
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(πr) are correlated with the level of investors’ efforts (a), 
and thus C and πr can be respectively denoted as C(a) and 
πr(a) . Based on the principal-agent theory, the agent’s ef-
fort cost is ( ) 21
2
C a ba= , where b is the cost coefficient 
for effort expended and 0b >  (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1987). For ease of discussion, assume the revenue (πr) of 
PPP projects is linear with the investors’ efforts contrib-
uted, that is ( )r a aπ = + θ, where θ is a random variable 
of a normal distribution and ( )20,Nθ ∼ σ . Then, the ex-
pected utility of the governments and the investors with-
out considering altruism are represented respectively by 
U1 and U2 as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )









U E R p a
U E R a p a ba
= − × π −
= + × π − −
 (2)
Generally, a self-enforcing contract is more preferred 
and effective compared to a strict one imposed upon via 
legal and regulatory means. However, the inherent self-
restraint of project parties has a positive impact on project 
efficiency improvement (Hosoda & Disney, 2006). There-
fore, the parties’ altruistic preferences should be consid-
ered when designing contracts. Considering both the 
governments’ and the investors’ behaviours are affected 
by their altruistic preferences, then their expected utilities 
are changed to *1U  and *2U  as follows (Loch & Wu, 2008):
*
1 1 1 2
*








where: 1 2Uε  and 2 1Uε  denote the altruistic utilities of 
the governments and the investors; 1ε  and 2ε  are respec-
tively the governments’ and the investors’ altruism, and 
1 2, 0,1ε ε ∈   .
In the ideal case, both the attitudes toward risks of 
governments and private investors can be comprehended 
based on the previous PPP projects that they have par-
ticipated in. More attempts, such as questionnaire, can be 
made to calibrate for the altruistic preferences. That is, al-
truistic preferences of the governments (ε1) and investors 
(ε2) can be assessed. In this scenario, substituting Eq. (2) 
into Eq. (3), their expected utilities with altruistic prefer-
ences can be expressed as follows:
( )( ) ( )











U p a a p a ba
U a p a ba p a
 − π − + ε + π − − 
 
= + π − − + ε − π −
 (4)
To sum up, the definitions of these relevant parameters 
are as follows in Table 1.
Comparing Eqs. (2) and (4), both the utilities of the 
governments and investors with altruism increase. This 
implies that their altruistic preferences create positive in-
centives during the cooperation. For private investors, par-
ticipating in PPP projects can help them establish positive 
images and obtain higher market exposure and visibility, 
which will indirectly improve their marginal benefits and 
further achieve the economic objectives; whereas for the 
governments, not only will altruism attract more invest-
ments from private investors, but also will encourage in-
vestors to invest a high level of efforts, which as a result ef-
fectively increases social benefits without aggravating the 
financial burden. The change in investors’ revenue based 
on their altruism is shown in Figure 3.
As the governments represent the public’s interest, their 
utility needs to be maximized first. To ensure sufficient at-
tractiveness of the projects, the utilities of the private in-
vestors should also be maximized. On the other hand, the 
investors by default are exposed to different opportunities 
Table 1. The definitions of the variables
Symbols Definitions
R1 The revenue of the governments
R2 The revenue of the investors
p The subsidy ratio provided by the governments
πe The estimated revenue of the investors
πr / πr (a) The actual revenue of the investors
a The efforts expended by the investors
C / C (a) The operation cost paid during the operation stage
b ( 0b > )
The cost coefficient for effort expended 
by the investors
θ (θ ∼ N (0, σ2)) A random variable of a normal distribution
1U
The expected utility of the governments 
without altruism
2U
The expected utility of the investors 
without altruism
1ε  
( 1 0,1ε ∈  ) The altruism of the governments
2ε  
( 2 0,1ε ∈  ) The altruism of the investors
*
1U




The expected utility of the investors with 
altruistic preferences
Figure 3. Two kinds of investors’ utilities
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to invest in various other projects, there will be an aver-
age return that they can get based on their experiences. 
Assume the average return be denoted as 0U . Then, the 
principal-agent model can be designed as follows:
( )( ) ( ) 21
1max 1
2e ep
p a a p a ba
  − π − + ε + π − −  
  
;
( ) ( )( )2 2 0
1 1
2e e
a p a ba p a U+ π − − + ε − π − ≥ ; s.t. (IR)
( ) ( )( )2 2
1max 1
2e e
a p a ba p a + π − − + ε − π − 
 
; s.t. (IC)
( )( )2* 1 1 pa
b
− ε −
= . s.t. (IC’)
where: (IR) is the set of constraints that ensures inves-
tor’s participation in the project; (IC) represents investors’ 
profit-driven nature; (IC’) is the first-order equivalent 
condition of (IC).
In practice, considering the uniqueness of a project 
that all procedures of decision-making and construction 
cannot be repeated, this is a non-repetitive game process 
between the governments and investors. During this one-
off game process, their altruism is a kind of inherent qual-
ity and will not be influenced by others’ strategies. Then, 
substituting (IC’) into the objective function, the first-
























where: *p  is the governments’ optimal compensation ra-
tio and *a  is the highest level of efforts that the investors 
will choose to put forth.
3. Model analysis and discussion
The PPP arrangements essentially emphasize risk shar-
ing mechanism by both governments and private inves-
tors. In order to analyse how altruistic preferences affect 
performances of both sides, the relationships between the 
optimal compensation ratio provided by governments *p  
and the investors’ chosen level of efforts *a , the utilities 
of both parties ( *1U  and *2U ) and their altruism (ε1 and 
ε2) need to be discussed.
Proposition 1. Only investors with a professional op-
eration ability and a rational expected revenue level could 
earn opportunities of participating in PPP projects spon-
sored by governments.
Confirmation: As *p  should be a positive value, it 
can be deduced that 









inequality demonstrates that when the cost coefficient of 
investors’ efforts (b) is a constant and their expected rev-
enue (πe) is too high (i.e., 
( )( )
( )








optimal government compensation ratio ( *p ) will be less 
than zero. As a result, in this case * 0p = , which means 
that the governments will not take any risk. In other 
words, the governments will not choose the investors as 
a partner.
Similarly, only when 
( )( )
( )









the investors will participate in PPP projects. Comparing 
two investors whose profitability are at the same level, a 
higher value of πe means a larger difference between the 
real and estimated revenue, and conversely the govern-
ments will need to provide less guarantees, namely *p  
declines. Likewise, when the expected revenues of the in-
vestors are same, a higher b represents worse operational 
capability of the investors, which will also result in the 
governments shouldering less expenditure risks instead 
(i.e. *p  decreases). In practice, investors should not ex-
pect excessive returns (πe), in case of losing the chance 
to participate in PPP projects. As for governments, they 
should utilize appropriate means to reduce the effort cost 
of investors (b), such as in-time sharing of information 
and technology.
Proposition 2. Investors are more likely to secure a 
winning chance of investment when the altruism of gov-
ernments is high. However, investors’ high altruism can-
not bring themselves governments’ favour.
Confirmation: As mentioned above, investors with the 
quality of 





− ε − ε − ε ε
π <
− ε
 could be chosen by 
the governments. Considering two factors ε1 and ε2 affect-
ing the above situation: 




− ε − ε − ε ε
− ε
 is positive-
ly correlated to ε1 and negatively correlated with ε2. With 
an increased value of ε1, the investors are more likely to 
be chosen. On the contrary, a higher value of ε2 makes 
bπe even harder to be lower than 




− ε − ε − ε ε
− ε
, 
which means that the investors are not preferred in this 
scenario.
In PPP projects, high altruism of the governments can 
drive them considering less of investors’ conditions. They 
pursue to serve the public and construct the required in-
frastructure as soon as possible. Therefore, the investors 
have higher chances of succeeding in this situation. On 
the other hand, excessive altruism exhibited by the inves-
tors may be questioned by the governments. Typically, 
the governments always consider the rationality of inves-
tors’ performance based on their profit-driven nature. Too 
many benefits provided during the first stage may bring 
more potential risks, such as making profits by cutting 
corners. As a result, for investors, subscribing to a proper 
level of altruism is important when cooperating with the 
governments.
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Proposition 3. In PPP projects, the effort level of in-
vestors is positively correlated to their altruism and nega-
tively correlated to the governments’ altruism.
Confirmation: In reality, the effort levels of investors 
are hard to be observed. However, it could be affected by 
the altruistic preferences of both the investors and the gov-
ernments. Specifically, the investors’ level of efforts is posi-
tively correlated to their altruism and negatively correlated 
to the governments’ altruism. As mentioned, an ethical 
mind could generate a positive impact on the participants’ 
behaviour. The investors’ altruistic preferences, which 
means a higher value of ε2, will lead them to pay more at-
tention to the public interests. Therefore, in the process of 
maximizing profits, the investors’ altruism will also help to 
improve project efficiency. Conversely, excessive govern-
ment altruism may create investors’ psychological depend-
ence and will not induce investors to expend more efforts. 
In this scenario, private investors do not have the pressure 
on profits since they are subsidized by the governments. 
This confirms the complex nature of project management: 
a higher level of efforts given by project managers does not 
always translate to a better project, whereas lower altruism 
may actually increase the investors’ productivity (Dur & 
Tichem, 2015). The investors’ estimated revenue πe also 
has a positive effect on the investors’ efforts. Apparently, 
the more revenue the investors want to obtain, the more 
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) for PPP projects. The relation-
ships between *a  and ε1, ε2 is shown in Figure 4, simu-
lated by the software MATLAB, which is a preferred com-
mercial mathematic tool and widely applied for advanced 
technical computing language and interactive environ-
ment of algorithm development, data visualization, data 
analysis and numerical calculation nowadays. According 
to the above analysis, in order to expect investors to invest 
the optimal level of productive efforts ( *a ), governments 
should appropriately reduce their altruistic preferences in-
stead, while should set some preferential terms to enhanc-
ing investors’ altruism.
Proposition 4. The government compensation ratio 
positively correlates to their altruism and negatively cor-
relates with the investors’ altruism.
Confirmation: Legitimately, a high value of ε1 reflects 
that the governments intend to attract more investments 
to facilitate infrastructure development in PPP projects. 
Conversely, if the investors prefer to share more risks aris-
ing from their high level of altruism 2ε , then the risk-
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. The relationships 
between *p  and ε1, ε2 is demonstrated in Figure 5. In 
this scenario, different from the implications from propo-
sition 3, only the governments present a higher level of 
altruism but private investors have a relatively low level 
will the investors can obtain more government subsidies.
Figure 5. Relationships between *p  and ε1, ε2
Proposition 5. If the governments are fully self-
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possess no altruism, where 1 0ε >  and 2 0ε = , and their 












Confirmation: When the governments present no 
altruistic preferences, i.e. 1 0ε = , investors’ altruism (i.e. 
2 0ε > ) can only affect the government compensation ra-
tio, and their effort level is a constant which is related to 
the expected revenue. Without the government incentive, 
there will not be enough motivation for the investors to 
expend a high level of efforts. Obviously, 
1 2
* *
0 0a aε = ε =>  
demonstrates that governments’ altruism may breed in-
vestors’ speculation, which should be highly noted when 
designing incentives.
Proposition 6. Both the expected utilities ( *1U  and 
*
2U ) of the governments and the investors are positively 
correlated with their altruistic preferences (ε1 and ε2), re-
spectively.Figure 4. Relationships between *a  and 1ε , 2ε
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Confirmation: Not only that an “altruistic mind” will 
promote sustainable development of investors, but also 
help to increase public benefits. The relationships between 
*
1U  and ε1, ε2; *2U  and ε1, ε2 are shown in Figure 6 and 
Figure 7. Compared with Figure 6, the investors’ utilities 
are more sensitive to the governments’ altruism. Accord-
ing to Figure 7, when ε1 is very small (say, equal to 0.1) 
and even when ε2 increases to 0.55, the value of *2U  is 
not growing synchronously. As the project sponsor and 
policy-maker, the governments can affect investors’ rev-
enue by setting incentives. Proper inventive mechanisms 
(such as appropriate tax exemption and recognition of the 
enterprise) will not increase the financial burden of the 
governments, but can effectively improve the utility value 
of the investors.
4. Numerical example
Nowadays, the number of altruistic PPP projects, such as 
in the field of ecological construction and environmental 
protection, health and senior care and education etc., has 
been increasing year by year (An et  al., 2018; Xu et  al., 
2015). Due to the large demand for such projects but the 
low rate of return, an effective policy or mechanism is es-
sential to attract private investors to participate (Solana, 
2014). However, the government guarantees for investors’ 
minimum profits are illegal. Giving full play to investors’ 
altruistic preferences reasonably through risking shar-
ing, helping to achieve their social responsibilities, has an 
important impact on the efficiency improvement of PPP 
cooperation.
In order to describe the proposed model in this paper 
more intuitively, a numerical simulation is presented. 
Generally, the private investors understand their own ef-
fort costs (b) and the expected revenue (πe) of participat-
ing in the projects clearly. In the ideal case, the govern-
ments can comprehend these two parameters through the 
investors’ past performance of the previous PPP projects 
that they have participated in. Also, data can be collected 
via using some objective measures, to determine whether 
to cooperate with these investors or not. Once the gov-
ernments select appropriate investors as a partner, some 
techniques can be used to measure the altruistic prefer-
ences of both the governments and the investors. For in-
stance, taking laboratory experiment into account, some 
subjects with certain experiences could be selected first, 
then provided with the necessary background information 
to simulate the investors’ behaviour. Questionnaires could 
also be designed to collect data if necessary. Actually, the 
altruistic preferences of the governments and the private 
investors are different. Based on whether the governments 
and investors have altruistic preferences, there are three 
scenarios, including only one of the governments or pri-
vate investors having altruism (e.g. scenarios 1 and 2), nei-
ther both sides having this preference (e.g. scenario 3) and 
both parties having altruistic preferences (e.g. scenario 4). 
Given many possibilities for the parameters of the inves-
tors and governments, values of the mentioned parameters 
based on various situations are assigned.
First, assume only investors have altruistic preferences 
and the government totally has no concern about the in-
vestors’ benefits. As shown in Table 2, the investors take 
all the revenue risk. When πe is a constant, the cost coef-
ficient for effort expended by investors (b) only has impact 
on investors’ utility. In the opposite scenario, when b is a 
constant, an increased expected revenue πe (from 0.5 to 
0.9) will drive investors to expend more efforts (from 0.25 
to 0.45), which as a result improves the utilities of both 
parties. This implies that inherent revenue momentum has 
a huge incentive effect. In this scenario, the investors still 
prefer to participate in a project even though the govern-
ments do not provide any guarantee, indicating that either 
the project is extremely profitable or that the investors ur-
gently need to boost up their reputation by cooperating 
with the government.
Next, assume that the investors totally have no con-
cern about others’ benefits and the governments take all 
the revenue risk. According to simulated results, the utili-
ties of both parties will not change no matter how b  var-
ies. Similar to some disaster relief projects, the decision-
making of PPP project is urgent, the governments have 
no better approach than to implement the project as soon 
as possible by offering attractive incentives. As a result, 
the investors will not pay much attention to their cost 
coefficients. Although the governments will earn a good 
reputation and investors could secure a good amount of 
Figure 6. Relationships between *1U  and ε1, ε2
Figure 7. Relationships between *2U  and ε1, ε2
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benefits, the level of investors’ effort cannot be improved, 
which indicates that the governments’ high altruism does 
in fact undermine the incentive effect.
Then, assume that the altruistic preferences of both two 
parties are equal to zero. This the special scenario of this pa-
per. Compared to scenario 1, the utilities of both parties are 
lower, and the decline in governments’ utility is particularly 
severe. This is because the governments have to shoulder 
more risks while the investors only care about their own 
profitability. This emphasizes the importance of considering 
altruistic preferences in increasing utilities again.
Fourth, when the degree of the governments’ altruism 
is extremely small, say 1 0.05ε = , increasing investors’ al-
truism can hardly affect their level of efforts expended and 
utility generated, which may damage the investors’ inter-
est in participating in the project. Conclusions shown in 
Figure 7 of part 4 could be verified.
Conclusions
Different from the original motivation of the “economic 
man” to maximize self-interests, the results of this study 
illustrate that non-subjective altruism will help private in-
vestors and the governments to achieve a better win-win 
contract. The governments can take advantage of altruism 
to guide investors into expending a high level of efforts 
and maximize the utility levels of both parties. Examples 
of such altruism include offering proper guarantees to 
share risks and enhancing the cooperative goal through 
the media publicity.
In PPP projects, the relationships between the gov-
ernments and the investors can be interpreted via the 
principal-agent model. As the sponsor and incentive de-
cision-maker of the projects, the governments should set 
an optimal subsidy mechanism to attract investments as 
well as making the best use of both parties’ altruism. In 
PPP projects, both parties’ utilities are determined by the 
subsidy ratio provided by governments (p*) and the efforts 
expended by the investors (a*) directly, and are also posi-
tively correlated with their altruistic preferences (ε1 and 
ε2) respectively. Specifically, the government compensa-
tion ratio (p*) positively correlates to their altruism (ε1) 
and negatively correlates with the investors’ altruism (ε2), 
while the effort level of investors (a*) improves with their 
increased altruism (ε2) and decreases with the increased 
altruism of governments (ε1). In spite of this, an excessive 
altruism of governments (ε1) is harmful to the expended 
effort level of investors (a*). Correspondingly, a high level 
of investors’ altruistic preferences (ε2) may cause suspi-
cion of the governments (p*), which will result in a failed 
bid. The comparison of two scenarios when governments 
are fully selfish (i.e., 1 0ε =  and 2 0ε > ) or the investors 




0 0a aε = ε => and that governments’ altruism may 
breed investors’ speculation. Additionally, both the inves-
tors’ expected revenue ( eπ ) and the effort cost (b) have a 
negative impact on the government subsidies ( *p ); but 
the investors’ expected revenue ( eπ ) affect the efforts in-
vested by investors ( *a ) positively, with the prerequisite 
for the effort cost 
( )( )
( )





− ε − ε − ε ε
<
π − ε
. The results 
provide a quantitative reference for the decision-making 
of both governments and private investors with altruism 
in PPP projects.
Table 2. Numerical simulation
Scenarios b πe ε1 ε2 *p *a *1U *2U
1 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.48
0.70 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.48
0.90 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.47
0.50 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.48
0.70 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.67
0.90 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.84
2 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
0.70 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
0.90 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
3 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.25 0.03 0.45
0.70 0.83 0.25 0.04 0.43
0.90 0.78 0.25 0.06 0.42
4 0.50 0.50 0.05 0.10 0.86 0.24 0.06 0.45
0.30 0.82 0.25 0.07 0.45
0.50 0.75 0.25 0.08 0.45
0.70 0.59 0.25 0.12 0.45
0.90 0.00 0.25 0.26 0.46
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In practice of PPP schemes, the role of governments 
for an appropriate government subsidy incentive is cru-
cial. First, the governments should investigate the oper-
ating background of private investors carefully to identify 
their expected revenue ( eπ ). Meanwhile, governments 
ought to express altruism ( 1ε ) from various perspectives, 
such as providing clear reward system, enhancing the rela-
tively fair and enabling market environment, less corrupt 
governance and presenting a great opportunity of financ-
ing for private investors to engaging in PPP projects. But it 
is not that the stronger the intensity of altruism ( 1ε ), the 
better; the degree of altruism ( 1ε ) is neither too severe 
nor too light, and the governments need to balance the 
relationship between the investors’ efforts ( *a ) and the 
government subsidies ( *p ) based on the specific scenario 
of different PPP projects. For private investors, they 
can make some attempts (such as questionnaire and sce-
nario simulation) to analyse the altruism of governments. 
Only they with a professional operation ability (b) and a 
rational expected revenue level ( eπ ) could earn opportuni-
ties of participating in PPP projects sponsored by govern-
ments. For instance, investors can apply some advanced 
techniques and share the information in time to reduce 
the cost of efforts (b); furthermore, investors should 
increase the awareness of altruism ( 2ε ) properly. This 
requires that private investors should also be fully aware 
of the great importance of altruism during cooperation, 
which can be treated as a process of maximizing benefits 
in PPP projects.
In conclusion, the contribution of the paper is to 
formulate an incentive mechanism in PPP projects for 
efficient governance based on altruism using principal-
agent theory. The findings contribute new insights into 
the development between the government subsidies and 
the altruistic preferences, severing as a reference when 
both the governments and investors make decisions in 
PPP projects. However, as the study of altruism is still 
evolving, there is no complete system to measure the 
preference parameters of project participants. Therefore, 
it is difficult to test the theoretical conclusions by us-
ing real cases. And also the game is a dynamic program, 
which means that the performances and strategies of 
both the governments and investors are changing during 
the cooperation process. Thus, the study of interactions 
between the governments and the investors with their 
altruistic preferences should continue to be groomed as 
a future direction of researches.
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